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Abstract
Unclear bailout policy, underinvestment and calls for bankers’ responsibility
are some of the observations from the recent financial crisis. The paper ex-
plains underinvestment as an inefficient equilibrium. Under ambiguous bailout
policy agents suffer from a lack of information with regards to the insolvency
resolution methods. Beliefs of bankers regarding whether an insolvent bank
is liquidated, may differ from those of depositors even if bankers and deposi-
tors possess absolutely symmetric information about the economy. It is shown
that such an asymmetry in beliefs results in underinvestment if the investment
climate is characterized by high aggregate risk. The paper suggests policy im-
plications aimed at the reduction of anxiety of agents and at aligning their
beliefs to restore efficiency.
JEL Classification: G28, D80
Keywords: bank bailouts; constructive ambiguity
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"Central banks have pumped a vast amount of money into the financial system
this year — but so far there is little evidence that this liquidity has found its way
into the broader economy" - Financial Times1
"...our call to commercial banks in general ... [is] to ship to the real economy
the extraordinary efforts that we are making ourselves. We call for their full
responsibility when they provide credit" - J.-C. Trichet2
1 Introduction
Despite unprecedented efforts of central banks to bail economies out of the recent
financial crisis the revival is slow and banking systems around the world are reported
not channel the liquidity provided by central banks further to the real sector. Along
with this breakage of the monetary transmission mechanism, the crisis leads to two
other important observations: (1) regulations with regards to insolvency resolutions in
banking (and non-banking) sectors have changed in major economies, and (2) there is
a sharp increase in efforts to make bankers more responsible for the (negative) events
in the banking sector. Although the two latter are meant to improve the soundness of
the financial system and thus contribute to the smooth channelling of funds to the real
sector, this is not the case. This paper suggests an explanation to this phenomenon
based on the uncertainty (ambiguity) about the policy response to bank failures.
Central Bankers often follow a policy of "constructive ambiguity", which means
that the bailout policy is not announced ex-ante (Goodhart and Schoenmaker [1995],
Santomero and Hoffman [1998], Bennett [2001] provide empirical evidence). This is
mostly justified by the objective of avoiding excessive risk-taking by banks (see a review
1 "Money struggles to pass through banking pipe" by D.Oakley, R.Atkins and G.Tett, Financial
Times, July 21 2009
2 Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, Press conference, Luxembourg, 2 July 2009
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by Enoch et al. [1997]) or by social benefits (see Freixas [2000] for a costs-benefits
analysis). Researchers address the issue of constructive ambiguity by assuming that
banks may be bailed out with some probability, which is known to the public. In
general, however, there is no reason to assume that this piece of information is available
to the agents.
Cukierman and Meltzer [1986] present one of the first models to encompass po-
litical ambiguity, in which they assume that the public forms rational expectations
about the policy indicators on the basis of the historical path of signals. However if the
macroeconomic environment and/or regulation change, such a path of signals from the
past can not be used in the expectation formation mechanism. In the models of Freixas
[2000] and Shim [2006] bankers are supposed to know the probability of bailouts. If
the policy of the regulator suddenly changes and there is no historical path of signals
to estimate the "true" probability distribution, they would still form homogenous ex-
pectations (beliefs) about the policy outcomes and there will be no significant change
in results (except for replacing objective expectations with subjective beliefs). Intro-
ducing depositors into the model makes the public heterogenous, which implies that
beliefs may differ among agents and implications of this are in the focus of the current
paper.
The paper studies an economy with agents (depositors) wishing to invest their
fixed endowment into a risky asset which dominates the risk-free one. However, they
have no access to the market of the risky asset, which justifies the existence of banks
in the economy. Banks are assumed to be completely financed through [uninsured]
deposits. Banks act as the second group of decision-makers in the economy, whose
investment decision is explicitly modelled. Finally, there exists a regulator which inter-
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venes if banks are insolvent. As usual, the regulator maximizes social welfare, which
in this paper’s setting means selecting such an intervention policy that the whole en-
dowment of depositors is invested through banks into the risky asset. Depositors and
bankers are unaware of the policy of the regulator who follows constructive ambiguity
but are able to identify the set of policies that are optimal from the point of view of
the regulator. Since there is no unique solution to the regulator’s optimization prob-
lem beliefs of depositors and bankers can differ and as a result the model produces
underinvestment in risky asset and overinvestment in the safe one.
It is not unusual to assume that banks have exclusive access to the superior in-
vestment technology. A classical explanation for that follows Benston and Smith [1976],
who derive the existence of banks through their role in transaction cost reduction. The
model in the current paper is built upon a similar assumption that captures the general
idea of incomplete market participation. The results would hold if the interactions are
embedded into a framework with a more sophisticated raison d’être for banks. Section
6 of the paper provides a discussion of possible applications of the model to differ-
ent settings, including delegated monitoring (Diamond, 1984) and liquidity provision
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) frameworks.
There exists some recent finance literature that takes a similar view on ambiguity
as here. The study of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) is the closest to the current
paper in that they consider a liquidity crisis and underinvestment that arises through
the inability of investors to rely on past data in building expectations. An interesting
feature in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) is that the aggregate probability dis-
tribution of liquidity shocks is known to agents and can be derived from the past data,
however it is impossible to derive the probabilities with which each individual agent
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would be hit by a particular liquidity shock. Other authors like Easley and O’Hara
(2009a) focus on price effects of ambiguity arising from agents’ preferences. A review of
the recent studies on ambiguity in finance can be found in Easley and O’Hara (2009b).
Contrast to these studies, ambiguity in the current paper arises from the decision of
the regulator and the multiplicity of optimal regulatory policies, which does not allow
market participants to anticipate the action of the regulator.
This also leads to policy implications that are qualitatively different from the
previous studies. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), for example, derive that ad-
verse outcomes of ambiguity can be avoided if central banks credibly commit to provide
agents with liquidity if the worst scenario is realized. Easley and O’Hara (2009a) come
to a similar conclusion that a regulatory intervention should be conditioned on the
realization of the worst scenario: this reduces the anxiety of agents. Importantly, these
studies assume ambiguity aversion or pessimistic agents who overweight the worst out-
come. On the technical side, in the current paper agents can exhibit optimism as well
as pessimism, which makes the results applicable to a more general case than only
pessimistic agents. On the qualitative side, the optimal policy design here aims rather
at the alignment of expectations of the heterogenous public than at the improvement of
the worst case for each agent. Conditioning interventions on the realization of macroe-
conomic events is a convenient tool for this. This novel effect of the macroeconomic
conditioning is due to the fact that, like in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), there
is no ambiguity about the aggregate macroeconomy (which still can be risky) and
macroeconomic indicators can be used as an objective publicly observed randomizer
that aligns expectations about the regulatory interventions.
The rest of the paper explores the above ideas formally. Section 2 introduces the
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economic environment which is risky but not ambiguous. In a risky environment, it is
possible that banks are insolvent, therefore insolvency resolution is discussed in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 determines the market equilibrium and demonstrates multiplicity of
regulatory policies that maximize social welfare, which generates ambiguity about the
choice of the regulator. Section 5 studies beliefs of agents and the market equilibrium
under ambiguity about the regulatory policy. Policy implications and possible exten-
sions of the model are discussed in Section 6. The paper concludes with a summary of
results.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of risk-neutral agents distributed at [0; 1]
and two types of financial assets, one risky3 and one risk-free. The model describes
two periods: in the first period decisions and investments are made, and in the second
period a state of nature s ∈ {H,L} is realized and investment gains reaped. Each
household is endowed with one unit of wealth in the beginning of the first period.
2.1 Markets
The markets of both risky and risk-free assets are characterized by an absolutely
elastic supply of assets. The risky asset yields a gross rate of return of rs in state of
nature s, the risk-free asset yields rF in each state of nature. The probability of state
s = H is p, and the probability of state s = L is 1− p. It is assumed that
rH > rF > rL (A-1)
and
prH + (1− p)rL > rF (A-2)
3 It may be convenient to think of the risky asset as of an investment project like a production
technology, which yields different outcomes in two different states of nature.
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Short sales are not allowed, hence the amount invested in financial assets is non-
negative. Assumptions A-1 and A-2 guarantee that a financial portfolio of a risk-neutral
agent would only contain the risky asset. Since the supply of the asset is perfectly elas-
tic, market equilibrium would result in the allocation of funds entirely in the risky
asset.
Since this is the reference point for the analysis, the regulatory policy would
be aimed at the provision of this risky allocation of funds. At teh first glance, this
somewhat contradicts the logic of the banking regulation, which is mostly aimed at the
reduction of risks. However, productive investment is usually associated with higher
risks than unproductive allocation of funds, and thus a regulatory policy that would
result in a safe allocation of funds is not realistic either.4 Such a policy of supporting
risky investment can also be found in the recent financial crisis (e.g. governments had to
intervene to prevent a sharp fall in mortgage lending, which banks considered a highly
risky investment.) The current paper focuses on such episodes when risky investment
is economically optimal and thus a regulatory policy that aims at the provision of such
an optimal risky outcome is natural in this setting.5
2.2 Banks
Assume, transaction costs prevent agents from entering the market for the risky
asset. They still have an access to the market of the risk-free asset. Transaction costs
justify the existence of banks, which offer a deposit contract with a duration of one
period and without a premature withdrawal option. The banking sector is assumed to
be of a unit size, perfectly competitive and homogenous. Banks belong to a small part
4 For example, narrow banking, though believed to be an example of a perfectly safe financial system, is never
implemented in practice.
5 In the discussion part we will show that a similar result could be obtained in a Diamond-
Dybvig (1983) setting, where the issue of such a risky policy objective does not arise.
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nature 
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 Period 1  Period 2 
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Investment 
Deposits 
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Banks 
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Portfolio 
gains 
Figure 1. Sequence of events
of agents, who manage banks and are called bankers.6
The sequence of interactions between banks and depositors is shown in Fig. 1.
In the first period, three actions take place: first, banks are created, then deposits are
collected and, finally, banks invest. In the beginning of the second period, the state
of nature is realized. Other three actions take place in the second period: first, banks
reap portfolio gains, then deposits are repaid, and the banks are closed. The economy
terminates at the end of the second period.
There exists also a regulatory authority (regulator), which chooses in the first
period to either liquidate or bail out insolvent banks. The term "liquidation" is used
to describe the insolvency resolution, as opposed to the duly closure of each bank at
the end of the second period, when the economy terminates.
3 Insolvency Resolution
In the first period, banks collect deposits in the amount of D and invest them in
a portfolio with share x of the risky asset and share (1− x) of the risk-free one. In the
6 Throughout this paper, banks and bankers are synonyms. Bankers are infinitesimal in the population.
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second period, if the state of nature s ∈ {H,L} is realized, the value V s of a bank is
V s =
[
xrs + (1− x) rF
]
D (1)
The bank is insolvent if V s < rDD. If the insolvent bank is liquidated, each
depositor receives V
s
D
per unit of the initial deposit and thus faces the state-contingent
rate of return xrs+(1− x) rF . If the insolvent bank is bailed out, the regulator injects
liquidity in the amount of
max
(
rDD − V s; 0
)
= max
(
rD −
(
xrs + (1− x) rF
)
; 0
)
D > 0 (2)
and depositors are repaid in full.7
Bankers are assumed to internalize the costs of liquidation/bailout proportionally
to the gap between the value of the bank and the amount due to depositors. Hoggarth
et al. [2003] stress that government liquidity injections are mostly conditional on
changes in senior management, who lose their jobs8; at the same time, shareholders
bear some losses as well. Although management’s losing jobs is not relevant for the
one-period setting in this paper, the losses of shareholders still play an important role.
Specifically, in order to prevent moral hazard, government can mandate an infusion
of private sector capital, when performing an open bank assistance. Although there
is no moral hazard in the model, costs internalization prevents negative effects of the
limited liability (which is then a special case with zero costs internalization). Brown
and Dinç [2005] provide an empirical evidence on costs internalization for bank failures
in emerging markets. They report, in particular, that if a failed bank is taken over
by the state, pre-failure owners and top management lose the most; depositors tend
7 For the sake of brevity, the source of such a subsidy is not discussed here. It may be thought as taxes
collected by the Regulator from future generations, which are not considered in the two-period setting here.
8 They say that Paul Volcker, asked once by a bank’s CEO, what would he reply to a banker
requesting a bailout, answered that he would be glad to discuss the issue with the banker’s
successor. ("Smach the glass", Economist, Oct. 18th, 2007)
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to lose much less, if anything. These ideas (job/reputation loss by management and
private capital infusions) are captured by the internalization of costs.
The internalization of costs need not be symmetric in the liquidation and in the
bailout case, therefore we assume that bankers internalize fraction λ ∈ [0; 1] of the
portfolio-deposits gap if the bank is liquidated and fraction µ ∈ [0; 1] if it is bailed out.
The payoff of bankers in the liquidation case is hence[
max
(
xrs + (1− x) rF − rD; 0
)
− λmax
(
rD −
(
xrs + (1− x) rF
)
; 0
)]
D (3)
and in the bailout case it is[
max
(
xrs + (1− x) rF − rD; 0
)
− µmax
(
rD −
(
xrs + (1− x) rF
)
; 0
)]
D (4)
If the costs internalization is symmetric, λ = µ, the payoff of bankers if liquidated
is the same as if bailed out, and as a result, bankers’ choice does not depend on the
regulatory policy. The asymmetric case can serve as a metaphor for other distortions
in the decision-making by bankers, which can be caused by the regulatory policy. If
λ = µ = 1, we obtain complete internalization of costs by bankers, which corresponds
to "unlimited liability".9 If λ = µ = 0, bankers enjoy limited liability. To rule out the
limited liability effects, we assume from this point that λ, µ > 0.
No moral hazard issues arise here as no asymmetry of information is assumed.
If bankers wish to collect deposits and declare bankruptcy after reaping the invest-
ment gains, the proceeds of the investment are fully verifiable and the above described
insolvency resolution procedure presumes that they are used to repay to depositors.
Therefore bankers have no incentives to declare themselves insolvent. Furthermore,
9 To avoid possible negative consumption in the second period, we might assume that agents obtain in the
second period a lump-sum payment additionally to the investment payoff. In this case the penalty on
bankers (internalized bailout costs) is deducted from this amount. This additional payment does not change the
decision-making in the first period, this is why it is superfluous for the analysis and not considered in the text.
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portfolio selection is costless and does not require any [potentially unverifiable] efforts.
With regards to unfair pricing, positive penalties ensure that bankers have no incentives
to establish excessively high interest rate on deposit. Although constructive ambigu-
ity cannot be justified here through moral hazard, it will arise in the next section as
multiple optima of the social welfare function.
The focus on bailouts and liquidations is mainly due to the simple setting of
the model which however suffices to demonstrate the effects of political ambiguity. In
general we only need to require that the regulator has several policy options which
might have asymmetric effects on the public. As we will see below, the result does not
require that λ = µ. To obtain the inefficiency result in Section 5 it will suffice that the
policy options available to the regulator create asymmetric outcomes at least for one
group of agents. Bailouts and liquidations capture this property.
4 Optimal Bailouts
In this section, we derive the optimal bailout policy of the regulator. As usual,
the regulator maximizes social welfare. Since the public strictly prefers the risky asset
to the risk-free one (see Section 2), the public is better off if the total endowment of
depositors is invested in the risky asset. Therefore, the Regulator chooses the probabil-
ity of bailout to ensure that in the resulting equilibrium (1) agents deposit their entire
endowment with banks, and (2) bank portfolios consist entirely of the risky asset.
In period 1, the Regulator decides upon bailout probability z. This section studies
the effect of z on the equilibrium by assuming that depositors and bankers are aware
of z.
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4.1 Households
Households decide upon the composition of their portfolio with share a of deposits
and (1− a) of the safe asset and search for max
a
Ge, s.t. 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, with Ge- expected
gains of households:
Ge = zarD + p (1− z) amin
{
rD; xrH + (1− x) rF
}
(5)
+(1− p) (1− z) amin
{
rD; xrL + (1− x) rF
}
+ (1− a) rF
In (5), the first term corresponds to the deposit payoff in the bailout case: a units
of deposit are repaid in full with interest rate rD no matter whether the bank is solvent
or not. The second and the third terms correspond to state-contingent deposit payoffs
in the liquidation case: if the bank is insolvent, depositors only obtain xrs+(1− x) rF
pro unit of deposit in each state of nature s. The fourth term describes the payoff
through investment in the safe asset, which depends neither on the state of the nature
nor on the liquidation/bailout decision of the regulator.
Since there is a unit mass continuum of households possessing a unit endowment, a
solution of the individual optimization problem above determines the aggregate supply
of deposits:
Ds = a∗ ∈ argmax
a
Ge (6)
Solving for a∗ is straightforward due to the linearity of Ge in a: depositors place
their entire endowment as deposits with banks, as soon as the expected return from
depositing is higher than the risk-free rate of interest. If the expected deposit payoff
equals to the risk-free return, households are assumed to invest in the deposit contract.
This assumption simplifies the exposition. A possible interpretation of it could be
infinitesimal transaction costs, induced by a purchase of the risk-free asset. From
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the straightforward solution of the optimization problem it follows that for a given
probability of bailouts z, aggregate deposit supply is given by
Ds
(
rD, x
)
=
{
1 if rD ≥ rDD
0 if rD < rDD
(7)
with rDD = r
F +
(1− p) (1− z)
p+ z (1− p)
x
(
rF − rL
)
(8)
Note that the demand for deposits depends on the deposit interest rate rD and
on the financial quality of the bank x, and is parametrized on the bailout policy z.
Term (1−p)(1−z)
p+z(1−p)
x
(
rF − rL
)
represents the interest margin, which depositors require in
order to switch from risk-free assets to deposits. It is distinct from the risk premium,
which is zero since agents are risk-neutral.
4.2 Banks
In period 1, each bank decides upon its portfolio composition x and the amount
of deposits D to be collected. The banks are aware of two possible actions of the
Regulator: bailout with probability z, and liquidation with probability 1 − z. The
state contingent payoff of banks is conditioned on the state of nature s and on the
action of the regulator and discussed in Section 3. The expected payoff function of
bankers takes the following form:
Πe = pmax
[
xrH + (1− x) rF − rD; 0
]
D + (9)
(1− p)max
[
xrL + (1− x) rF − rD; 0
]
D −
p (zµ+ (1− z)λ)max
[
rD −
(
xrH + (1− x) rF
)
; 0
]
D −
(1− p) (zµ+ (1− z)λ)max
[
rD −
(
xrL + (1− x) rF
)
; 0
]
D
The first two terms correspond to the expected profit of banks under limited
liability. The third and fourth terms stand for the costs internalization. Note that
with no internalization, the probability of bailout would vanish from the expected
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payoff of banks.
Each bank seeks for max
x,D
Πe subject to D ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. The solution of
this optimization problem is again straightforward due to its linearity in both D and
x. As a result, if the Regulator bails out insolvent banks with probability z ∈ (0, 1],
and if banks internalize the cost of bailouts (λ, µ > 0), the optimal choice
(
x∗, Dd
)
of
each competitive bank is:
x∗ ∈
{
[0; 1] if rD > rDB
{1} if rD ≤ rDB
(10)
Dd ∈
 {0} if r
D > rDB
[0,∞) if rD = rDB
{∞} if rD < rDB
(11)
with rDB =
prH + (zµ+ (1− z)λ) (1− p) rL
p+ (zµ+ (1− z)λ) (1− p)
Note that in a banking sector of a unit size, Dd above describes the aggregate
demand for deposits.
4.3 Equilibrium and Optimal Bailout Rule
Now we need to define the deposit market equilibrium and find the optimal bailout
policy. If we denote with X∗ equilibrium aggregate investment in the risky asset, and
with D∗ - equilibrium aggregate amount of deposits, then the optimal policy of the
regulator is the one, for which X∗ = D∗ = 1 as this allocation maximizes social welfare:
for risk neutral depositors utility is higher when the whole endowment is invested in
the risky asset.
Definition 1 For a given bailout policy z, competitive equilibrium is the allocation of
funds (X∗, D∗) and the interest rate rDc , which provides
1. X∗ = x∗Dd with
(
x∗
(
rDc
)
,Dd
(
rDc
))
∈ argmaxΠe
2. Ds
(
rDc , x
∗
)
= a∗ ∈ argmaxGe
3. D∗ = Ds
(
rDc , x
∗
)
= Dd
(
rDc
)
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The definition of equilibrium requires that deposit supply equals deposit demand.
Note that equilibrium is parametrized on the bailout policy of the regulator. The
portfolio choice x∗ by banks is uniquely determined by the equilibrium interest rate rDc
and the regulator’s choice of z. Given x∗ and D∗, the equilibrium investment in the
risky asset is determined by X∗ = x∗D∗.
Proposition 1 The competitive equilibrium is:
X∗ = D∗ = 1 (12)
rDc =
prH + (zµ+ (1− z)λ) (1− p) rL
p+ (zµ+ (1− z)λ) (1− p)
for any bailout policy z ∈ [max (z, 0) ; 1] with
z =
λ (1− p)
(
rF − rL
)
− p
(
prH + (1− p) rL − rF
)
(1− p) p (rH − rL)− (µ− λ) (1− p) (rF − rL)
(13)
The proposition straightforwardly follows from equating deposit supply and de-
mand functions (7 and 11). Fig. 2 illustrates the proposition. Bailout policy threshold
z is determined from the condition rDD < r
D
B which ensures socially optimal investment
X∗ = D∗ = 1. It is easy to check that z < 1.10


rD
Dd
Ds
D1
prH+(zµ+(1−z)λ)(1−p)rL
p+(zµ+(1−z)λ)(1−p)
rF + (1−p)(1−z)
p+z(1−p) (r
F − rL).. .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .
Figure 2. Equilibrium with known bailout/liquidation policy z
10 The nominator is smaller than the denominator if and only if µ < p
1−p
rH−rF
rF−rL
, with the
right-hand side strictly greater than unity due to Assumption A-2.
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As an additional result we observe that penalties on bankers (internalization of
bailout/liquidation costs) can require that the regulator avoids commitment to liqui-
dation. In particular, if λ is high and greater than µ, regulator should avoid bailout
policies with too low z, otherwise banks’ behavior is too cautious and the efficient
allocation cannot be achieved in equilibrium.
This issue of agents exhibiting cautious behavior receives a greater importance
as soon as we assume that the regulator follows the policy of constructive ambiguity
and/or cannot credibly communicate z to the public. Depositors and bankers are aware
of objectives of the regulator and know the solution of the regulators optimization
problem. However the multiplicity of optima makes the policy ambiguous. The next
section studies the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation if bankers and depositors
make decisions under ambiguity.
5 Ambiguous Bailouts
Assume the regulator does not commit to any bailout rule. Without loss of
generality we consider the range of potentially optimal bailout policies z ∈ [z; 1], and
substitute for z = 0 wherever λ < p
1−p
prH+(1−p)rL−rF
rF−rL
. Uncertainty about the regulatory
policy induces uncertainty about the payoff structure in the model. Note that the
analysis above does include uncertainty in form of a possible mixed strategy of the
regulator, i.e. a stochastic bailout-liquidation rule. Now it is assumed that depositors
and bankers possess less information than before, but still are symmetrically informed
about the economy. To be precise, depositors and bankers are informed about the
following: (1) the set of players in the economy, (2) set of strategies of each player,
and (3) payoff functions of all players. Payoff functions are stochastic and determined
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by the realization of the random variable s, which determines the state of nature, and
consequently, the realization of the return of the risky asset.11 As shown above, under
uncertainty in terms of stochasticity (Arrovian uncertainty) the equilibrium allocation
is efficient, if the bailout policy is chosen from a suitable range. Ambiguity (Knightian
uncertainty) is distinct from stochasticity.
5.1 Nature of Ambiguity and Decision-making
Under assumption of rationality, agents should be able to predict, which policy
the regulator chooses, if they know the payoff function of the latter. Since it was
assumed that the objective of the regulator is to provide for efficiency of the equilibrium
allocation, both depositors and bankers can identify that this objective can be achieved
through any policy in the range z ∈ [z; 1]. There is no reason, why both depositors
and bankers should count for the same probability of bailouts. Clearly, depositors and
bankers operate under uncertainty, which is represented by a continuum of probability
distributions over the regulatory policy. This kind of uncertainty is a special case of
ambiguity.
One of the relevant concepts for decisions under ambiguity is the notion of pes-
simism and optimism. Wakker [2001] defines optimism and pessimism on the basis of
choices, which agents would make, if their actions lead to different outcomes in different
states of the world, probabilities of which are unknown. For example, if households in
the current paper have access to the market of the risky asset, but are not aware of the
probability distribution p, they would also face ambiguity. Knowing that two states of
nature are possible, they might prefer to invest in the risky asset (which corresponds
to optimism) or to invest in the risk-free asset (which corresponds to pessimism). The
11 One might wish to see nature as a fourth player in the game. This would require additional discussion, which
is not in the focus of the current paper.
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reason for that is that for an optimist, the best possible outcome overweighs the worst
one, and for a pessimist the opposite is true.12
There are several ways to capture optimism and pessimism in the decision-
making.13 Same agents can exhibit both optimistic and pessimistic behaviors in differ-
ent situations or even take into account both best and worst outcomes in their decisions.
To show that an equilibrium outcome under ambiguity may differ from the one under
a stochastic bailout rule, we assume that agents weigh best and worst. If we denote
the degree of pessimism with α, then depositors maximize the following functional:
α min
z∈[z;1]
Ge (z) + (1− α) max
z∈[z;1]
Ge (z) (14)
with Ge (z) denoting the expected gains of depositors (5) for a given bailout policy z.
We can also interpret α as the fraction of depositors that exhibits pessimistic behavior
and 1− α as the optimistic fraction. The above functional then represents an average
depositor.
The first term in (14) corresponds to pessimism and counts for the worst out-
come, and the second term corresponds to optimism and counts for the best outcome.
Extreme pessimism corresponds to α = 1. The ambiguity itself is captured by the
fact that bailouts may follow any probability distribution z ∈ [z; 1]. More generally,
z ∈ ∆z ⊆ [0; 1] with ∆z capturing the degree to which agents are informed about the
regulatory policy. If ∆z = {ẑ} then (14) turns into G
e (ẑ), and we obtain the above
discussed case without ambiguity.
Differentiating (5) with respect to z yields ∂G
e
∂z
= 0 if rD > xrH + (1− x) rF , or
12 Gneezy et al. (2006) provide a paradoxical experimental evidence that a lottery over the
best and the worst may be valued significantly lower than the worst outcome itself. Decisions
under ambiguity, as described in the text, are not related to such behavioral effects.
13 Chateauneuf et al. (2007) introduce non-extreme outcome additive capacities (neo-additive
capacities) to represent the CEU as a weighted sum of the EU-term, a pessimistic term, and
an optimistic term. Simple capacities (see, e.g. Eichberger and Kelsey, 2000) also capture the same possibility.
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∂Ge
∂z
> 0 in all other cases. Therefore, the worst expected outcome for depositors is
associated with liquidation of banks: min
z∈[z;1]
Ge (z) = Ge (z). The best expected outcome
takes place if the regulator bails out insolvent banks: max
z∈[z;1]
Ge (z) = Ge (1). This implies
that under ambiguity depositors maximize
α min
z∈[z;1]
Ge (z) + (1− α) max
z∈[z;1]
Ge (z) = (15)
(1− α (1− z)) arD + (1− α) arD + αp (1− z) amin
{
rD; xrH + (1− x) rF
}
+
α (1− p) (1− z) amin
{
rD; xrL + (1− x) rF
}
+ (1− a) rF
Note that technically (15) repeats (5) if we replace z := 1− α (1− z).
We can do the same exercise for banks, by replacing Ge (z) in functional (14) with
expected payoff of bankers Πe (z) from (9). Assume that the degree of pessimism of
bankers is given by β, which is not necessarily equal to α. Again, we need to identify,
what is the worst outcome for bankers, who internalize bailout costs:
∂Πe
∂z
= −p (µ− λ)max
[
rD −
(
xrH + (1− x) rF
)
; 0
]
D −
− (1− p) (µ− λ)max
[
rD −
(
xrL + (1− x) rF
)
; 0
]
D
For positive values of D we obtain ∂Π
e
∂z
< 0 if µ > λ (∂Π
e
∂z
> 0 if µ < λ) for all rD,
except rD < xrL + (1− x) rF , in which case ∂Π
e
∂z
= 0. If bankers internalize insolvency
costs equally in liquidation and bailout case, µ = λ, their choice is independent of
bailout policy.
If µ > λ, the worst expected outcome for bankers is associated with bailouts:
min
z∈[z;1]
Πe (z) = Πe (1). The best expected outcome is associated with liquidation:
max
z∈[z;1]
Πe (z) = Πe (z) (it is vice versa, if µ < λ). Similarly to depositors, bankers
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maximize the functional:
β min
z∈[z;1]
Πe (z) + (1− β) max
z∈[z;1]
Πe (z) = (16)
=
{
βΠe (1) + (1− β) Πe (z) if µ ≥ λ
βΠe (z) + (1− β) Πe (1) if µ < λ
TermsΠe (1) andΠe (z) differ only with regards to the internalization of bailout/liquidation
costs. Denote
θ =
{
βµ+ (1− β) (zµ+ (1− z)λ) if µ ≥ λ
(1− β)µ+ β (zµ+ (1− z)λ) if µ < λ
. (17)
Functional (16) takes now the form
pmax
[
xrH + (1− x) rF − rD; 0
]
D + (18)
(1− p)max
[(
xrL + (1− x) rF − rD
)
; 0
]
D −
θpmax
[
xrH + (1− x) rF − rD; 0
]
D −
θ (1− p)max
[(
xrL + (1− x) rF − rD
)
; 0
]
D,
which technically repeats (9) with zµ+ (1− z)λ := θ.
Note that similarity between (15) and (5) as well as between (18) and (9) is only
technical and does not arise through substitution of z with some perceived probability of
bailouts. The latter would be the case if we consider asymmetric information leading
to different degenerated priors ∆z = {ẑ} for depositors and bankers. Instead, the
information is symmetric, and both face the same prior ∆z = [z; 1] for the bailout
policy. Even more, depositors and bankers treat the missing information in the same
way, and as a special case we can obtain equal degrees of pessimism α = β. It is the
combination of the degree of optimism/pessimism and the worst/best outcomes that
technically replaces z in the objective functions.
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5.2 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
As noticed above, technically the objective function of depositors (15) under
ambiguous bailout policy repeats their objective function (5) with z := 1− α (1− z).
Their optimization problem is the same as before. To determine the supply of deposits,
it suffices to substitute for z := 1− α (1− z) in (7):
Ds
(
rD, x
)
=
{
1 if rD ≥ rDD
0 if rD < rDD
(19)
with rDD = r
F +
(1− p)α (1− z)
p+ (1− α (1− z)) (1− p)
x
(
rF − rL
)
The same applies to banks. To determine their optimal choice, it suffices to
substitute for zµ+ (1− z)λ := θ in (11):
x∗ ∈
{
[0; 1] if rD > rDB
{1} if rD ≤ rDB
Dd ∈
 {0} if r
D > rDB
[0,∞) if rD = rDB
{∞} if rD < rDB
(20)
with rDB =
prH + θ (1− p) rL
p+ θ (1− p)
We can define an equilibrium in a similar way as before:
Definition 2 For given degrees of pessimism α and β, the equilibrium under ambigu-
ity is the allocation of funds (X∗, D∗) and the interest rate rDa , which provide
1. X∗ = x∗Dd
2. Ds
(
rDa , x
∗
)
= a∗
3. D∗ = Ds
(
rDa , x
∗
)
= Dd
(
rDc
)
where
(
x∗
(
rDa
)
,Dd
(
rDa
))
maximizes β · min
z∈[z;1]
Πe (z) + (1− β) · max
z∈[z;1]
Πe (z)
and a∗ maximizes α · min
z∈[z;1]
Ge (z) + (1− α) · max
z∈[z;1]
Ge (z).
Note that the equilibrium is not anymore parametrized on the bailout policy, since
the latter is not announced. Instead, the equilibrium is parametrized on the degree of
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pessimism of the agents. The following proposition establishes that the economy can
settle in an inefficient equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium under ambiguity is given by:
X∗ = D∗ =
{
1 if p · p+(1−α(1−z))(1−p)
p+θ(1−p)
≥ r
F−rL
rH−rL
0 if p · p+(1−α(1−z))(1−p)
p+θ(1−p)
< r
F−rL
rH−rL
rDa ∈
{ {
rDB
}
if p · p+(1−α(1−z))(1−p)
p+θ(1−p)
≥ r
F−rL
rH−rL[
rDB ; r
D
D
]
if p · p+(1−α(1−z))(1−p)
p+θ(1−p)
< r
F
−rL
rH−rL
with rDB =
prH + θ (1− p) rL
p+ θ (1− p)
,
rDD = r
F +
(1− p)α (1− z)
p+ (1− α (1− z)) (1− p)
(
rF − rL
)
,
and θ =
 βµ+ (1− β) (zµ+ (1− z)λ) if µ > λµ if µ = λ
(1− β)µ+ β (zµ+ (1− z)λ) if µ < λ
.


rF + 1−p
p
(rF − rL)
rD
prH + (1− p)rL
Dd
Ds
D1
.... . .. . . .. . .. . . .
Figure 3. Equilibrium under ambiguity: an example
Condition p · p+(1−α(1−z))(1−p)
p+θ(1−p)
≥ r
F
−rL
rH−rL
characterizes the investment climate in the
economy: it relates risk, pessimism and rates of return. Figure 3 highlights the intuition
behind the proposition, assuming α = θ = 1 and z = 0. Competitive banks choose
x∗ = 1 and set the deposit rate so that their expected profit is zero. If D > 0, this
implies deposit interest rate of prH+(1− p) rL, which should exceed or be equal to the
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rate rF + 1−p
p
(
rF − rL
)
, required by depositors. This is only possible if p2 ≥ r
F−rL
rH−rL
. In
fact, inefficient equilibria appear because bankers exhibit cautious behavior and avoid
acquiring deposits at high interest rates. At the same time, pessimistic depositors
exhibit cautious behavior as well, and avoid depositing at interest rates which make
the expected return on deposits lower than the risk-free rate.14 It is important that
bankers do not need to exhibit pessimism or optimism (which is the case if µ = λ): the
equilibrium can be inefficient due to the cautious behavior of depositors solely.

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

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
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




rH−rF
rH−rL
1
1−p
µ
λ

θ−λ
µ−λ
= 1− α(1− z)
βµ+ (1− β)λ
α(1− z)
θ
 Informed agents
..
.....
. .. . .. .
..........
. . .. . . .. . .. .
...............
.. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. .
....................
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .. ... .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. ..
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 Inefficient equilibria
Figure 4. Degrees of pessimism, costs internalization and inefficient equilibria
Figure 4 provides an illustration of the result for arbitrary degrees of pessimism
and costs internalization. Condition p · p+(1−α(1−z))(1−p)
p+θ(1−p)
≥ r
F
−rL
rH−rL
corresponds to the
area below the threshold line θ = p
1−p
rH−rF
rF−rL
−α (1− z) p r
H−rL
rF−rL
, which intersects the axes
in points p
1−p
rH−rF
rF−rL
> 1 and 1
1−p
rH−rF
rH−rL
> 1 (both are above unity due to Assumption
A-2). For some given level of θ, the dotted area in the picture represents inefficient
14 The expected return as given by the probability of the states of nature, not by the bailout policy.
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equilibria. Threshold θ represents the highest level of θ which precludes existence of
inefficient equilibria even for highest possible degree of pessimism of depositors and the
toughest possible liquidation policy, i.e. for α (1− z) = 1:
θ =
p
1− p
prH + (1− p) rL − rF
rF − rL
. (21)
Inefficient equilibria can only appear if θ > θ, which implies that the necessary
condition for them to appear is θ < 1 ⇔ p2 < r
F
−rL
rH−rL
. Recalling that the risky project
is characterized by the expected return of r = prH + (1− p) rL and by the variance of
σ2 = p (1− p)
(
rH − rL
)2
yields the following interpretation of the necessary condition
for inefficiency of equilibria:
σ2 >
(
rH − rL
) (
r − rF
)
. (22)
According to (22), an ambiguous bailout policy is more likely to lead to the
inefficiency of financial intermediation in economies with relatively high investment
risk. On the contrary, if the investment risk is relatively low (σ2 ≤
(
rH − rL
) (
r − rF
)
),
then ambiguity in the bailout policy does not have any effect on the efficiency of
equilibrium, for any uncertainty attitude of the public.
Recall that objective functions of depositors (15) and bankers (16) under ambi-
guity technically coincide with their objective functions (5) and (9) under announced
bailouts if z := 1 − α (1− z) for depositors and zµ + (1− z)λ := θ for bankers. If
the regulator can make the public aware that bailout policy z is chosen then beliefs of
depositors and bankers align along the line θ−λ
µ−λ
= 1− α (1− z) in Figure 4, which lies
entirely in the area of efficient equilibria, no matter how (un)favorable the investment
climate is in the economy and what degree of costs internalization is imposed by the
insolvency regulation.
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6 Policy implications and discussion
The model above justified the existence of banks by their exclusive access to the
market of risky assets. In spirit of Benston and Smith [1976] this could be explained
by high transaction costs and by the ability of banks to reduce them. Although the
system of financial markets in the economy is complete, depositors only have access to
one of them, and this incomplete participation problem prevents them from achieving
the efficient allocation of resources. Banks re-establish efficiency. The regulation in
this paper concerns insolvency resolution rules. If these rules are unclear, the efficient
outcome can be destroyed. This section first considers some policy implications of the
model and then discusses possible extensions to capture other functions of banks.
Translating the above inefficiency condition θ > θ in terms of costs internalization
µ and λ would give a policy implication in spirit of Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2008), i.e. aiming at reducing the anxiety of the agents. Inefficiency condition θ > θ
turns into µ > λ > θ
(1−β)(1−z)
− β+(1−β)z
(1−β)(1−z)
µ or λ > µ > θ
1−β(1−z)
− β(1−z)
1−β(1−z)
λ depending
on which of the policy options brings higher penalties to bankers, or into µ = λ > θ in
the case of symmetric penalties. Recall that θ is fully described by the macroeconomic
parameters such as risk and expected return of the risky asset as well as the risk-free rate
of return. Thus the regulator can avoid inefficient outcome by reducing the penalties
imposed on bankers below the threshold value given by macroeconomic conditions. If
the regulator wishes to maintain asymmetric penalty effects of the two policy options
then the degree of bankers’ pessimism/optimism β should also be taken into account.
Both µ and λ can be reduced to ensure efficiency. Reducing the higher of the two
measures µ and λ shrinks the inefficiency intervals above and thus makes it easier for
the regulator to ensure efficiency for any β. By reducing the lower one the regulator can
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abandon the inefficiency interval straightforwardly. None of these actions will preclude
depositors’ cautious behavior but they will reduce the anxiety of bankers who will go
for a higher interest rate demanded by depositors.
A completely different policy implication relies on the ability of the regulator to
align the beliefs of the public instead of reducing their anxiety. If the regulator can
credibly commit to either of the policy options then inefficiency never occurs. However,
as mentioned in the introduction, there can be reasons that make such a commitment
undesirable, in which case the regulator would prefer some mix of the two options. The
question is therefore whether some non-degenerate probability distribution z can be
credibly communicated to the public. If this is possible then public beliefs are homoge-
nous and Proposition 1 guarantees an efficient allocation of resources in equilibrium.
If the regulator can use an external publicly observed randomizer than the problem is
solved.
The conclusions of the model seem robust to the definition of banks and the role
they play. A more sophisticated justification of banks would appear if asymmetric
information is introduced into the model, and banks act as delegated monitors (Dia-
mond, 1984). This could be done by assuming that there are many borrowers i who
all have access to identical risky production technology described by p, rH and rL as
in the above model but have different managerial skills and thus generate projects
characterized by different rLi and r
H
i . Banks can improve the quality of the projects
through active monitoring and thus achieve the parameters rH and rL of the risky in-
vestment, which is superior to the distributions available without monitoring. The rest
of the analysis is unchanged. Delegated monitoring function of banks provides ground
for insolvency and competition regulation: (1) bank failures should be costly to create
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incentives for bankers to monitor properly, and (2) restrictions on diversification would
reduce the efficiency of monitoring cost reduction (Diamond, 1996). Again, the role of
the regulator in application to the model above consists in the determination of a clear
insolvency resolution rule and penalties for bankers.
To provide an additional reason for the bailout policy, a framework with bank
runs could be used. This would require a complete reformulation of the model. In the
bank run model of Diamond and Dybvig [1983], the liquidity provision role of banks
arises because the system of available financial markets is incomplete, and banks create
a market that allows agents to insure against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (the incom-
plete markets setting complements the incomplete participation setting that is used in
the current paper). However, patient depositors have incentives to mimic impatient
depositors and withdraw their funds early, if they expect the bank to be unable to
cover all early withdrawals. A deposit insurance financed through taxes on depositors
(who are owners of mutual banks) prevents bank runs. Since banks offer deposit con-
tracts that implement the ex-ante optimal allocation (c1, c2) with consumption by early
withdrawal strictly less than consumption by late withdrawal, c1 < c2, deposit guaran-
tees need not be promised with certainty. Indeed, any bailout probability z ∈
[
c1
c2
, 1
]
would prevent a bank run, since the expected payoff of patient depositors is at least
c1 in case of a bank run and strictly greater without bank runs. This multiplicity of
regulatory optima would create the same ambiguity problem as in the model in the
current paper. The rest of the analysis would then be built upon a similar reasoning as
in the model above: if bankers internalize bailout/liquidation costs and the conditions
of the deposit contract are negotiated in the market, where depositors and bankers
have different beliefs with regards to failure resolutions, then inefficient allocation of
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resources can appear as an equilibrium outcome. The inefficiency in this case would
mean that the resulting deposit contract would be strictly dominated by investment
opportunities available in existing markets.
7 Conclusions
Regulatory ambiguity and political opacity have been for a long time being in
the center of economic debates. The common approach to the issue is representing an
opaque regulatory policy with a probability distribution over its possible realizations.
This approach fails to capture possible heterogeneity of beliefs of uninformed agents.
If the policy of the regulator is not announced, the public estimates the likelihood of
the future outcomes according to their degrees of pessimism or optimism. Even if the
public are homogenous in their ambiguity attitude, they can form different beliefs, if
the regulation has an asymmetric impact on them.
In the current paper, regulatory ambiguity is studied in the market equilibrium
framework. It is shown that even if agents are perfectly rational and symmetrically
informed about each other, as well as about the macroeconomic environment, some
missing piece of information can play a crucial role in determining the equilibrium
outcome. The fact that the regulator is better informed about his policy than the
public, does not create a problem of asymmetric information, since the regulator does
not participate in the market interactions. If the perfectly rational public are informed
about the objective function of the regulator, they may wish to find the optimal reg-
ulatory policy, which they would count for in their decision-making. However, if there
are multiple optima, the public have to make decisions under ambiguity.
Regulatory ambiguity is studied here in application to the deposit market. An
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ambiguous bailout policy creates an asymmetry in beliefs of depositors and bankers
with regards to the action of the regulator in case of banks’ insolvency. This may
result in a suboptimal allocation of funds as compared with the market outcome. In-
forming agents about the probability of bailouts eliminates the asymmetry in beliefs
and restores the optimal allocation of funds. This result provides a reason for limiting
the "constructive ambiguity" to a stochastic bailout rule with a probability of bailouts
known to both bankers and depositors. A possible way to achieve this is to condi-
tion the bailout policy on a publicly observed macroeconomic parameter with known
probability distribution. This parameter then plays the role of a publicly observed
randomizer that aligns beliefs of the public.
The inefficiency result is more likely for economies (or time periods) with high
aggregate investment risk and high internalization of bailout/liquidation costs by banks
(penalty on bankers). If the regulator cannot credibly signal about his policy, and as
a result the beliefs of the public cannot align, efficient equilibria still can be ensured,
if the internalization of bailout costs by banks is low and aggregate investment risk is
low. This comparative static exercise is in line with the observations from the recent
financial crisis. In the pre-crisis environment with lower aggregate risk underinvestment
was not an issue and constructive ambiguity did not seem to create a problem. The
crisis has contributed to the aggregate investment risk and generated a wave of debates
on "social responsibility" of bankers leading to increased penalties for bankers. As the
model predicts, these two factors combined with an ambiguous bailout policy lead
to underinvestment in the real sector. Although there are many other factors that
contribute to underinvestment, the objective of the current paper was to draw attention
to the one which importance seemingly has been underestimated in the "goldilocks
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economy": some negative effects of political ambiguity can only be seen in times of
high aggregate risk.
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